Watches  Movements  and Parts  1954   Report to the President on Escape clause Investigation No  26 Under the Provision of Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951

Watches Movements and Parts 1954 Report to the President on Escape clause Investigation No 26 Under the Provision of Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951


  • Author : United States Tariff Commission
  • Publisher :
  • Release Date : 1954
  • Genre:
  • Pages : 92
  • ISBN 10 : STANFORD:36105128907891


Watches Movements and Parts 1954 Report to the President on Escape clause Investigation No 26 Under the Provision of Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Book Description :

Intellectual Property Law

Intellectual Property Law


  • Author : Jay Dratler, Jr.
  • Publisher : Law Journal Press
  • Release Date : 2020-02-28
  • Genre: Law
  • Pages : 3394
  • ISBN 10 : 1588520544


Intellectual Property Law Book Description :

This book discusses the TRIPs Agreement, the Madrid Protocol and other international conventions, and compares the basic principles of U.S.

Governance Structures and Decision Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks

Governance Structures and Decision Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks


  • Author : Anita Tuladhar
  • Publisher : International Monetary Fund
  • Release Date : 2005-09-01
  • Genre: Anti-inflationary policies
  • Pages : 27
  • ISBN 10 :


Governance Structures and Decision Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks Book Description :

This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.

Safeguard Measures in World Trade

Safeguard Measures in World Trade


  • Author : Yong-Shik Lee
  • Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
  • Release Date : 2014-02-28
  • Genre: Law
  • Pages : 416
  • ISBN 10 : 9781781956076


Safeguard Measures in World Trade Book Description :

Safeguard Measures in World Trade tackles the controversial issue of restrictions on imports. Professor Yong-Shik Lee skillfully argues that Safeguards interfere substantially with the normal stream of trade, and their improper application undermines t

Enforcement  Private Political Pressure and the GATT WTO Escape Clause

Enforcement Private Political Pressure and the GATT WTO Escape Clause


  • Author : Kyle Bagwell
  • Publisher :
  • Release Date : 2004
  • Genre: Commercial treaties
  • Pages : 43
  • ISBN 10 : UCSD:31822021047220


Enforcement Private Political Pressure and the GATT WTO Escape Clause Book Description :

"We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if they are self-enforcing. We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among governments that acquire private information over time. In this context, we provide equilibrium interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and GATT/WTO escape clauses. We find that governments achieve greater welfare when they negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs rather than precise tariff levels; furthermore, when governments negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs, the observed applied tariffs often fall strictly below the bound. Our analysis also provides a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in the same industry for a time period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic usage constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.